THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT 1894

REPORT OF COURT

No. S482

s.t. ROSS CLEVELAND (ON 183398)

In the matter of a Formal Investigation held at the Victoria Galleries, City Hall, and the Chamber of Shipping, Kingston-upon-Hull, on the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 21st and 22nd days of October 1968 before MR. J. V. NAISBY, QC, assisted by MR. R. A. BEATTIE, BSC, MRINA, CEng, and MR. W. F. WRIGHT, into the circumstances attending the loss of the steam trawler *Ross Cleveland* with the loss of eighteen lives.

The Court having carefully inquired into the circumstances attending the above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds for the reasons stated in the Annex hereto, that the loss of the *Ross Cleveland* and of the lives of eighteen of her crew was due to the fact that the vessel had insufficient stability to stand up to the relatively exceptional occurrence of a combination of winds of hurricane force with corresponding sea conditions and heavy ice formation on her superstructure over a substantial period which there was little or no opportunity of clearing.

Dated this fourth day of November 1968.

J. V. NAISBY, *Judge*

We concur in the above Report.

R. A. BEATTIE
W. F. WRIGHT } *Assessors*

Annex to the Report

1. The *Ross Cleveland* was a single screw steam trawler of riveted steel construction, with an 8-inch keel and 8-inch bilge keels over 50 feet amidships, built by John Lewis and Sons Ltd. at Aberdeen in 1949 for Hudson Bros. Trawlers Ltd. The vessel's gross tonnage was 659·27 tons and her registered dimensions were 178·40 feet × 30·15 feet × 15·15 feet.

2. The *Ross Cleveland* had a single deck with a break of 12 inches at 5·5 feet forward of midships. The moulded depth amidships was 16 feet to deck at side (excluding break); there was a sheer of 5 feet at the forward end and 7 feet at the after end and a camber of 9 inches amidships; 3-inch wood sheathing covered the weather deck. There were five complete watertight bulkheads extending to the main deck; one at the after end of the fore peak dry tank; one at the forward and one at the after ends of the fish hold; one at the after end of the cofferdam abaft the fish hold; one at the after end of the oil fuel bunkers; the bottom was of open floor construction throughout. The compartments of the vessel below deck commencing from the forward end were: fore peak dry tank; chain locker and two deep fresh water tanks (total capacity 33·5 tons) with a store room above; fish hold (capacity 14,300 cubic feet); cofferdam; oil fuel bunkers (total capacity 301 tons); combined boiler and engine space and shaft recess; cod liver oil tanks and aft peak dry tank at lower level with crew accommodation over; cod liver oil residue tank and store space in the overhang.

3. Above deck the erections consisted of the following:

A forecastle 34 feet long with a mean height of 7·5 feet. Access to the forecastle was by a non-watertight steel door situated near the middle line. The dimensions of the door were 4 feet 6 inches × 2 feet with a coaming of 18 inches in height. The forecastle contained 2 WCs, washplace, drying room and sleeping accommodation for 14 men. The main deckhouse was 77 feet long and 14·5 feet wide. The height was 8·75 feet forward reducing to 7 feet aft. The deckhouse had thirteen 10-inch diameter opening sidescuttles, one 16-inch diameter escape sidescuttle aft, and two 21-inch × 15-inch windows forward all provided with deadlights or steel plate covers. At the after end, a steel rubber-jointed door which also gave access to the accommodation and machinery spaces, was 4 feet 6 inches × 2 feet with an 18-inch coaming and was in halves provided with 5 toggles operable from either side. The deckhouse contained master's and mate's accommodation, machinery casings, galley, mess room, drying room, washplace and WC. The engine room skylight and lifeboats were situated on top also a companionway and vertical ladder access to the accommodation. The vessel had a poop whose front was 2 feet 6 inches abaft the after end of the deckhouse; it had a length overall of 17 feet and height of 7 feet. The poop contained the steering gear and cod liver oil boilers and had a steel non-watertight access door 4 feet 6 inches × 1 foot 9 inches with an 18-inch coaming on the starboard side.

4. Bulwarks extended from poop to forecastle 3 feet 6 inches in height at the after end and 4 feet 6 inches at the forward end. Seven freeing ports were provided in the bulwarks each side, the foremost being just forward of the break. These ports were 24 inches long × 17 inches deep with their lower edges 7 inches above the deck. The foremost ports had drop shutters and the remainder had steel flaps.

5. The wheelhouse structure fitted above the forward end of the main deckhouse had a maximum breadth of about 20 feet and contained the wheelhouse, chartroom, radio room and funnel casing.

6. Hatchway accesses to below deck were as follows:

Hatchway within the forecastle 2 feet 6 inches long × 2 feet 6 inches wide leading to forward stores with 9 inch steel coamings and wood covers. One hatchway outside the forecastle leading to the forward store space was 3 feet 11 inches long and 3 feet 9 inches wide. One hatchway to the fore end of the fish hold was 3 feet 8 inches long and 3 feet 9 inches wide. These two hatchways were provided with $2\frac{1}{2}$ inch wood covers, tarpaulins, battens and wedges and had 18 inch coamings. Three more hatchways to the fish hold were two 5 feet long by 3 feet 9 inches wide and one 9 feet long by 3 feet 9 inches wide. These three hatchways had watertight steel covers secured by turnbuckles and had 18 inch coamings. Access to the cofferdam space was via port and starboard bunker type flush scuttles 20 inches in diameter.

7. Permanent ballast was carried as follows:

29·7 tons in the bottom (mainly under engines, boiler and aft peak).

8. The foremast was situated 16 feet abaft the forecastle end, was 51 feet heel to truck, had a rake of $1\frac{3}{8}$ inch per foot, and was supported by wire stays. A derrick 26 feet long was fitted on the after side of the foremast with its heel about 11 feet above the deck. A tubular aluminium alloy mizzen mast, situated abreast the lifeboats was 43 feet heel to truck and had a rake of $1\frac{3}{8}$ inch per foot. The trawl gallows were fitted forward and aft on the port and starboard sides.

9. Ventilation of the accommodation was by mushroom vents on the house top. The engine room was ventilated by 15 inch diameter cowl vents and the stokehold via the funnel.

10. The main engine was steam reciprocating direct acting with 3 cylinders 15 inch, 25 inch and 42 inch diameter by 27 inch stroke. There was one multi-tubular oil-fired return tube boiler 16 feet in diameter by 11 feet long with three furnaces and a working pressure of 225 lbs. per sq. inch. The propelling machinery developed an indicated horse power of 900 and gave the vessel a speed of $12\frac{1}{4}$ knots.

11. The electrical supply was derived from:

1×20 kilowatt steam generator

1×8 kilowatt diesel generator

both producing 110 volts direct current.

12. The lifesaving equipment included:

2×23 feet wood lifeboats each for 31 persons, one port and one starboard on the main deckhouse top aft (i.e. boat deck) and served by Schat gravity davits

2 Elliot 10 man inflatable liferafts

1 Elliot 12 man inflatable liferaft

6 circular cork lifebuoys; 2 on bridge deck, 4 on boat deck (2 with lines and 2 with lights)

22 Victory (P) kapok filled lifejackets stowed in indivdual rooms

1 Schermuly Supreme line throwing apparatus

12 parachute distress rockets

1 Aldis daylight signalling lamp.

13. Radio equipment consisted of:

1 main transmitter: Marconi Ocean Span MK VII operated off mains; transmits W/T on medium and high frequencies and R/T on intermediate and high frequencies; fitted with an associated auto-alarm signal generator Marconi type 2402A;

1 emergency transmitter Marconi Kestral III: works off batteries (2 sets provided) on R/T on intermediate frequencies (2182 kcs); auto alarm signal generator incorporated;

1 VHF transmitter/receiver: Redifon G.R.286 MK.II mains operated with bridge remote control;

2 portable liferaft radio telephones: Woodsons Rescufones; battery operated working R/T on 2182 kcs and incorporating auto alarm signal generator;

2 Atlanta receivers operated from mains and batteries covering all frequencies; extension loudspeaker to wheelhouse.

14. Navigational equipment consisted of:

2 magnetic compasses and 1 spare;

1 type 14/12 Kelvin Hughes marine radar;

1 LJ-11 Loran by Redifon Ltd.;

1 Marconi Lodestone direction finder;

1 Simrad EH2A echo sounder;

1 Fishgraph 11 echo sounder.

15. The *Ross Cleveland* sailed from Hull on the morning of 20th January 1968, bound for the Icelandic fishing grounds and manned by a crew of twenty hands all told. On 25th January fishing began off the northeast corner of Iceland, but the weather was not favourable and the vessel moved to the northwest corner of Iceland. On 26th January the weather was not favourable for fishing, and the cook was taken ill, and the *Ross Cleveland* went into Isafjord and landed the cook who was taken to hospital. Water tanks were topped up, and the vessel returned to her fishing ground, Kogurgrunn, but it was not until the next day that fishing could be resumed. The weather continued patchy until 2nd February and during this period the vessel was sometimes able to fish but at times fishing had to be suspended. On the morning of 1st February, a telegram was sent by the owners to the *Ross Cleveland* in the following terms: "Suggest carrying on fishing. Come for Monday's market. What do you advise?" The skipper replied: "Intend coming for Monday's market." The 1st February was a Thursday, and it would rather look as if the Monday suggested was Monday, 12th February. In the afternoon of 3rd February a bad weather forecast was received, and the skipper of the *Ross Cleveland* determined to seek shelter in Isafjardhardjup. A considerable number of other trawlers were also fishing in the same neighbourhood as the *Ross Cleveland* and they also determined to seek shelter—most of them, at any rate —in the same fjord as the *Ross Cleveland*. They all proceeded to the fjord at reduced speed with a following wind and sea. Some of them came to anchor in some of the little fjords adjoining Isafjardhardjup, but some of them, because of lack of room to anchor in shelter, were compelled to lay and dodge in the main fjord. The weather got worse and all ships were icing up, clearing the ice as much as possible. These conditions continued throughout the night of 3rd February and 4th February with a wind of hurricane force and continuous snow. About 2330 on 4th February due to ice on the scanner, the *Ross Cleveland* was unable to use her radar. The trawler *Kingston Andalusite*, which was close by, to starboard of her, was asked to pass information obtained from her radar to the *Ross Cleveland* and agreed to do so. Some ten minutes later, about 2340 hours, just as the *Ross Cleveland's* radar had got into operation again, the *Ross Cleveland* and the *Kingston Andalusite* which had been laid with the wind on her starboard side, determined to get head

to wind and dod
the fjord in orde
the western side.
and with engines
skipper of the *Ro*
his vessel head ir
to respond. The e
and the *Ross Cle*
on her port side,
some three miles
Ross Cleveland w
the skipper of th
some doubt on th
Cleveland ever b
head into the wi
succeeded. The m
starboard side of
heeled over to po
of the starboard
ing where he sav
process of launcl
The raft was lau
that he was struc
and came to in t
it by the other tw
flaps of the lifer
able to close t
washed into the
tion of its equip
occupants were a
by improvised m
were very differe
little clothing on
and he soon beca
by his companic
hours. The seco
more warmly cla
proof clothing, a
a little later. Th
was wearing pr
vive, and about
was able to get
stagger along th
the lee of which
ing was found b
mate to reach h
given hot drinks
Icelandic Rescu
search, to whic
later in this rep
engaged in that
mate was carrie
taken to hospita
found one wear
was due to drow

16. There wa
the weather con
from four sour

(1) from th
in the form
his evidence
experienced
NNE, force
ing; visibilit
or – 8°C.; wa

(2) Mr. Sig
landic Meteo
ness. He agre
of the weath
was able to
perature not
loss was mea
and on 5th F
fore say tha
less than esti

to wind and dodge across to the eastern side of the fjord in order to avoid being set aground on the western side. With her wheel hard a starboard and with engines working at half speed ahead, the skipper of the *Ross Cleveland* endeavoured to bring his vessel head into the wind. She, however, failed to respond. The engines were rung full speed ahead, and the *Ross Cleveland* heeled over to port and lay on her port side, capsized and sank, in a position some three miles off Arnanes light. The loss of the *Ross Cleveland* was reported within a few minutes by the skipper of the *Kingston Andalusite*. There was some doubt on the evidence as to whether the *Ross Cleveland* ever began to alter to starboard to get head into the wind or not, but she certainly never succeeded. The mate, who stated that he was in the starboard side of the wheelhouse, said that the vessel heeled over to port and that he was able to get out of the starboard door and climbed aft along the casing where he saw two members of the crew in the process of launching one of the inflatable liferafts. The raft was launched, and the mate gave evidence that he was struck by a sea and washed overboard and came to in the liferaft, having been pulled into it by the other two men who were in it. One of the flaps of the liferaft had been torn, but they were able to close the other. However, a heavy sea washed into the raft, taking out a considerable portion of its equipment, including the bailer, but the occupants were able to reduce the water in the raft by improvised means. The three men in the liferaft were very differently dressed. One of them had very little clothing on which was, of course, wet through, and he soon became unconscious and, despite efforts by his companions, died in about one and a half hours. The second occupant of the raft, who was more warmly clad but who was wearing no waterproof clothing, also succumbed to the cold and died a little later. The mate, who was warmly clad and was wearing protective clothing, managed to survive, and about daylight the raft grounded. The mate was able to get out, drag the raft clear of the water, stagger along the shore to an empty house under the lee of which he stayed the night, and next morning was found by a shepherd boy who assisted the mate to reach his home farm where the mate was given hot drinks, dry clothing and put to bed. The Icelandic Rescue Organisation had mounted a search, to which further reference will be made later in this report, and one of the fishing vessels engaged in that search put in near the farm. The mate was carried on a stretcher to the vessel and taken to hospital in Isafjord. Two other bodies were found one wearing a lifejacket. Death in both cases was due to drowning.

16. There was evidence before the Court as to the weather conditions on the night of 4th Februry from four sources:

(1) from the Meteorological Office at Bracknell, in the form of an affidavit by Mr. Rattray, and his evidence as to the weather likely to have been experienced at the time of the loss was: wind NNE, force 11 or 12; probably heavy snow falling; visibility very limited; air temperature —7 or – 8°C.; water temperature probably about 2°C.

(2) Mr. Sigtryggsson, the Director of the Icelandic Meteorological Office, was called as a witness. He agreed with Mr. Rattray's interpretation of the weather reports, with one exception. He was able to inform the Court that the sea temperature not very far away from the scene of the loss was measured on 1st February at – 0.6°C. and on 5th February at – 1.7°C. We could therefore say that the sea temperature was probably less than estimated by Mr. Rattray.

(3) The third source of information before the Court as to the weather conditions prevailing at the time of the loss came from the skippers of three trawlers which were also sheltering in Isafjardhardjup, at the same time. Skipper Whur of the *Kingston Andalusite* was, at the time of the loss, approximately two cables to starboard of the *Ross Cleveland*. He said that at about 2100 hours on 4th February the wind was force 11 plus and that he believed that winds were recorded up to 120 miles per hour on an instrument which broke after that. He said that he had never experienced such weather in all his time at sea, although he had been fishing in trawlers for 22 or 23 years, had been a skipper for about eight years, and that about six of these were spent fishing at Iceland. His vessel also had accumulated a considerable quantity of ice which they had done their best, when opportunity offered, to clear. The skipper of the *Ross Cleveland* spoke to him on the VHF and said his vessel was going over. The lights of the *Ross Cleveland* were seen to disappear. Skipper Whur put his helm hard aport with his engines full speed ahead to try to go to the assistance of the *Ross Cleveland*. The *Kingston Andalusite*, however, took a heavy heel to port, and her skipper was compelled to bring her back head to wind for the safety of his own vessel and crew. Skipper Lee of the *Kingston Garnet*, which was also sheltering in the neighbourhood, said that his vessel had frozen snow all over the ship, and in consequence was in what he described as a very unseaworthy state, despite the fact that he and his crew had done what they could to remove the ice, and for a few minutes his vessel laid at such an angle that he thought the ship was going to turn over. He said that he had been going to Iceland as a skipper for seven years, and although he had experienced icing to the same extent before, he had never met wind in such conditions, by which he was understood to mean of such strength. The third skipper was Skipper Russell of the *Kingston Emerald* which was also sheltering in the same area. He also heard the conversation between the skippers of the *Ross Cleveland* and the *Kingston Andalusite*. He described the weather as absolutely atrocious, and he thought force 12, but in gusts probably more, and it was snowing very very hard. He also had had what he described as tremendous difficulty when, after laying for a time, he wanted to get his vessel back head into wind and dodge. He said that his vessel heeled over tremendously, and estimated the heel as 30 to 35 degrees.

(4) Mr. Hafstein, who is the Superintendent of the National Life Saving Organisation of Iceland, also gave evidence before the Court, and spoke of having received reports from the representative of that organisation in Isafjord, that the force of the wind was at least 12, that it was snowing very heavily, and that there was frost.

17. The trawler *Notts County* was driven ashore on the eastern side of Isafjardhardjup, and one Icelandic fishing vessel was also lost the same night. In the opinion of the Court, it is indeed fortunate that more vessels were not lost.

18. The *Ross Cleveland* was classed 100 A.1. trawler with Lloyds. The *Ross Cleveland* had been surveyed by Lloyds surveyor for docking survey and annual survey and for engine and boiler survey and tailshaft continuous line up in June 1967, and at the same time was surveyed by a surveyor on behalf of the Hull Mutual Insurance Company, and was in good order and in every respect seaworthy so far as construction and upkeep was concerned. The question of the stability of the vessel in normal circumstances and at the time of the loss will be dealt with later.

19. The life saving appliances of the *Ross Cleveland* were all in order.

20. About midnight on 4th February the Superintendent of the National Life Saving Association of Iceland was informed that the trawler *Notts County* had stranded on the east coast of Isafjardhardjup and that the Icelandic fishing vessel *Heidrun* had been in trouble in making port, and that all contact with her had been lost. Shortly after midnight the Superintendent also received information about the loss of the *Ross Cleveland*. The Icelandic coastguard vessel *Odinn* proceeded to the assistance of the vessels in distress. She was unable to make any contact with the *Heidrun* and the *Odinn* had to seek shelter to chop ice before she was able to proceed any further. The weather conditions had interrupted telephone communication between the various stations of the National Life Saving Association, but nonetheless on 5th February extensive searches were made in Isafjardhardjup in the vicinity of where the *Ross Cleveland* was lost, both on the coast and by fishing boats afloat as far as was possible in the extreme weather conditions prevailing, followed by an aeroplane search when the weather allowed.

21. The Court wishes to express its appreciation of the searches carried out by the National Life Saving Association of Iceland and of the courtesy of the Icelandic Government in making available their weather reports and allowing Mr. Hafstein and Mr. Sigtryggsson to attend the Inquiry. The efforts of the master and crew of the *Odinn* in rendering or attempting to render help to the British vessels in trouble on this occasion are worthy of high praise and we understand have already been recognised by Her Majesty's Government.

22. No recent accurate stability data for the *Ross Cleveland* were available, but after the loss of the vessel an inclining experiment was carried out on a sister ship of very nearly the same age. Both vessels had been trawling successfully for a number of years without any untoward incident. From the information obtained, the *Ross Cleveland* was fit to proceed on a voyage to the Icelandic fishing grounds under weather conditions likely to be encountered but she was unable to withstand a relatively exceptional combination of winds of hurricane force with corresponding sea conditions even in the shelter of Isafjardhardjup and a prolonged period of heavy ice formation on her superstructure.

23. This Inquiry and that into the loss of the *Kingston Peridot* clearly demonstrate the necessity for the investigation of the stability of trawlers, particularly those fishing in Arctic waters. This matter has been under consideration by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (hereinafter referred to as "IMCO"). A Committee of this Organisation has compiled a document which, it is understood, is likely to be approved by the Assembly next year. This document was circulated in January of this year. It recommends the Administrations (i.e. the Governments of its members) to adopt certain criteria to ensure a standard of stability in fishing vessels. The recommendations are for new buildings and are stated to be minima. These recommendations were based upon an allowance for ice accretion which in all probability was exceeded in both the case of the *Ross Cleveland* and the *Kingston Peridot*. The Court appreciates the value of obtaining international agreement upon any question which will help to ensure the safety of life and property at sea. It is emphasised that the recommendations are to Governments, and it is open to any Government to set for their own vessels a higher standard. The Court suggests that before any official regulations or recommendations are made it should be seriously considered whether the IMCO standards should be accepted or some higher standard should be set.

24. The desirability of trawlers being supplied with and carrying stability data is clear. There is, however, a practical difficulty in giving adequate information to skippers in a form which is easily understood and enables them to forestall the dangers of excessive ice conditions.

25. Various methods of preventing or removing the accumulation of ice have been considered over a number of years without any appreciable success. Quite recently further devices have been suggested and it is understood that some of them are being tried on a particular trawler fishing in the Icelandic grounds. It is recommended that as far as possible efforts in this direction should be encouraged as a matter of urgency.

26. One question which was raised during the course of these inquiries was whether trawlers or certain trawlers should be prohibited from fishing north of Iceland in the winter months. Shortly before the beginning of this Inquiry, the committee appointed to advise on trawler safety, presided over by Admiral Sir Deric Holland-Martin, issued an interim report* recommending as an urgent experimental measure the provision of what might be termed a "mother ship" for trawlers fishing in Icelandic waters this winter. According to announcements in the press during the course of this Inquiry, Her Majesty's Government have accepted this recommendation. This obviates the necessity of this Court dealing with this question. We would draw attention to paragraphs 16 and 17 of that interim report. In our opinion no control officer can have at his disposal the varying conditions of all the trawlers in the area which affect their stability, and we strongly endorse the recommendations in those paragraphs that the decision must be left to each individual skipper. This Committee are also concerned with the question of any restriction on vessels fishing north of Iceland and will no doubt have at its disposal a great deal more evidence germane to this subject than was before us. We would only offer the suggestion that if steps are taken to ensure that trawlers when built, or in the case of older trawlers after being built, have an adequate reserve of stability to meet the combination of extreme conditions that pertained in these two cases, the necessity for considering any such restriction might not arise.

27. The evidence in this Inquiry demonstrated the advisability of some form of protective clothing being available for the crews of trawlers in the event of a casualty when they had to leave the vessel. This matter is under consideration by the Hull Mutual Insurance Society and perhaps other organisations connected with trawlers, and it seems that a small, comparatively cheap form of such clothing can be obtained of such a size that a sufficient number can be packed in a liferaft.

28. It is clear from the evidence adduced in these three inquiries, namely the *St. Romanus*, and *Ross Cleveland*, and the *Kingston Peridot*, that it is of the utmost importance that the owners and builders of trawlers should co-operate wholeheartedly with the Board of Trade on questions affecting the safety of trawlers and that no one should delay or sit back when any question affecting the safety of trawlers and their crews at sea is raised and rely upon someone else to take the initiative. There was

* *Trawler Safety: interim report of the Committee of inquiry into trawler safety.* (Cmnd. 3773) (HMSO; 1*s.* 9*d* by post 2*s.* 1*d.*)

evidence of some such co-operation in the past, but there was also evidence that it had not always taken place. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Court it has been demonstrated that there is a need for all parties to the fishing industry, owners and builders of trawlers and of skippers and crews, to play their part in making what must be a hazardous occupation as safe as possible.

29. The parties to this Inquiry were: the Board of Trade, represented by Mr. Barry Sheen, QC, Mr. Michael Thomas, and Mr. David Steel, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor; Hudson Brothers Trawlers Ltd. (the owners) and Mr. C. P. Hudson, the designated manager, represented by Mr. Gerald Darling, QC, and Mr. Geoffrey Brice, instructed by Messrs. Andrew M. Jackson & Co.; the Transport & General Workers' Union and the relatives of five deceased members of the crew represented by Dr. Lionel Rosen and Mr. Calman Rosen of Messrs. Pearlman & Rosen; Mr. H. Eddom, the mate, represented by Mr. Loncaster of Messrs. Dawson, Loncaster & Co.

Questions and Answers

The Court's answers to the Questions submitted by the Board of Trade are as follows:

Q. 1. By whom was *Ross Cleveland* owned at the time of her loss?

A. 1. Hudson Brothers Trawlers Ltd. of Hull.

Q. 2. Where, when and by whom was *Ross Cleveland* built?

A. 2. Aberdeen; 1949; John Lewis & Sons Ltd.

Q. 3. How many officers and men did *Ross Cleveland* carry
(*a*) on her last voyage and (*b*) at the time of her loss?

A. 3. (*a*) twenty hands all told; (*b*) nineteen hands all told.

Q. 4. (*a*) What life-saving appliances were carried in *Ross Cleveland* on her last voyage?
(*b*) Did such life-saving appliances comply with the Merchant Shipping (Life Saving Appliances) Rules 1965?

A. 4. (*a*) See paragraph 12 of the Annex to the Report.
(*b*) Yes.

Q. 5. (*a*) When did the *Ross Cleveland* sail from Hull on her last voyage?
(*b*) Where was she bound?

A. 5. (*a*) On the morning of 20th January 1968.
(*b*) The Icelandic fishing grounds.

Q. 6. (*a*) Was the *Ross Cleveland* in all respects fit for her intended voyage at the commencement of her last voyage?
(*b*) If not, in what respects was she unseaworthy?

A. 6. (*a*)
See paragraph 22 of the Annex to the Report.
(*b*)

Q. 7. Where, when and how was *Ross Cleveland* lost?

A. 7. In Isafjordhur of Arnanes Light shortly after 2340 hours on 4th February 1968 by capsizing.

Q. 8. What were the conditions of weather, wind, sea and ice in the area in which *Ross Cleveland* was lost?

A. 8. Wind off hurricane force, with high seas, snow, and severe icing conditions, with visibility at times reduced almost to nil.

Q. 9. What was the cause of the loss of *Ross Cleveland*?

A. 9. The fact that the vessel had insufficient stability to stand up to the relatively exceptional occurrence of a combination of winds of hurricane force with corresponding sea conditions and heavy ice formation on her superstructure over a substantial period which there was little or no opportunity for clearing.

Q. 10. How many crew members lost their lives?

A. 10. Eighteen.

Q. 11. What was the cause of the loss of life?

A. 11. In the case of two members of the crew exposure in the weather conditions mentioned; two members of the crew were drowned and the remainder must be presumed to have been drowned also.

Q. 12. (*a*) Were searches for survivors instituted promptly and thereafter carried out efficiently?
(*b*) If not, why not?

A. 12. (*a*) Yes.
(*b*) Inapplicable.

Q. 13. Was (*a*) the loss of the *Ross Cleveland* or (*b*) the loss of the lives of those on board her caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of any person or persons, and if so, which person or persons?

A. 13. No.

J. V. NAISBY, *Judge*

R. A. BEATTIE, W. F. WRIGHT } *Assessors*

(867047) Dd. 143030 K7 1/69 St.S.